The Peter A. Allard School of Law

Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications

Allard Faculty Publications

2008

Humanitarian Assistance and the Private Security Debate: An
International Humanitarian Law Perspective
Benjamin Perrin
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, perrin@allard.ubc.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law
Commons, and the International Law Commons

Citation Details
Benjamin Perrin, "Humanitarian Assistance and the Private Security Debate: An International
Humanitarian Law Perspective" in On the Edges of Conflict Policy Papers (Ottawa: Canadian Red Cross,
2008).

This Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Allard Faculty Publications at Allard
Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
Allard Research Commons.

HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE AND THE
PRIVATE SECURITY
DEBATE:
AN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
PERSPECTIVE
Benjamin Perrin
Assistant Professor, University of British
Columbia, Faculty of Law
Faculty Associate, Liu Institute for Global Issues

Sponsored By:

Funded By:

Humanitarian Assistance & The Private Security Debate:
An International Humanitarian Law Perspective

On the Edges of Conflict

ABSTRACT
The changing nature of armed conflict has had a dramatic impact on the security risks facing
humanitarian personnel. Historically, the safety of humanitarian aid delivery was secured through the
consent of the relevant Parties to the conflict. However, non-international ethnically-motivated armed
conflicts, failed and failing states, and insurgency-based warfare have fundamentally challenged the
viability of this traditional security paradigm.
In confronting today's complex security climate, humanitarian organizations are faced with a diverse
menu of alternatives to enhance their security. The debate over armed protection that has sharply divided
the humanitarian community is explored in this paper, including a critique of specific armed protection
options. Tensions between the safe and efficient delivery of aid, and principles of impartiality, neutrality
and independence are discussed.
The implications of humanitarian organizations using private security companies for defensive armed
protection have been relatively unexplored, particularly with respect to international humanitarian law.
This paper aims to address this shortcoming by considering two threshold questions: is the protected
status of humanitarian personnel under international humanitarian law suspended or lost if they use armed
private security contractors; and, is humanitarian access to provide relief legally affected by the decision
to hire a private security company for armed protection of relief consignments?
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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE & THE PRIVATE SECURITY DEBATE:
AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW PERSPECTIVE
B ENJAMIN PERRIN *
“Without security, there can be no humanitarian aid or assistance, no reconstruction, no
democratic development. To suggest, as some have, that we can do one without the other
is nothing short of pure folly and, in fact, it’s dangerous.”1
– The Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, Government of Canada

I. INTRODUCTION
Nowhere has the impact of the changing nature of armed conflict on the delivery of humanitarian
assistance been more profound as in the controversial topic of security for humanitarian actors. While it
has long been recognized that “[t]he safety and security of humanitarian relief personnel is an
indispensable condition for the delivery of humanitarian relief to civilian populations”,2 there is a quiet,
but intense, debate in the humanitarian community about when, if ever, humanitarian organizations can
resort to private security for the defensive armed protection of humanitarian personnel, property, and
materiel.
Unfortunately, the literature on private military and security companies has overwhelmingly focused on
states as clients. Comparatively little attention has been paid to other clients, such as humanitarian
organizations.3 Those studies that have been undertaken on the prevalence of private security usage by
humanitarian actors have not engaged in any sustained analysis of the international humanitarian law
implications of this practice. This paper aims to contribute to this gap, while highlighting the tension
*

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia; Faculty Associate, Liu Institute for Global
Issues; LL.M. (honours), McGill University, Faculty of Law; J.D., University of Toronto, Faculty of Law; Member
of the Law Society of Upper Canada; Clerkship, Supreme Court of Canada. The author is pleased to acknowledge
the support of the Canadian Red Cross, Liu Institute for Global Issues and Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (Canada), in addition to research assistance from Tyson Stiege and Bethany Tapp. The views
expressed in this article represent only those of the author. Email: perrin@law.ubc.ca
1

CBC, “Development without security 'pure folly,' MacKay says in jab at Liberals”, February 9, 2008, online: CBC
<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/02/09/mackay-halifax.html>.
2

Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Vol. I (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 105 [Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck].
3

Two main studies undertaken on this topic will be referred to throughout this paper: James Cockayne, Commercial
Security in Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Settings: An Exploratory Study (New York: International Peace
Academy, 2006) [Cockayne]; and, Tony Vaux, Chris Seiple, Greg Nakano & Koenraad Van Brabant, Humanitarian
Action and Private Security Companies: Opening the Debate (2002), online: International Alert
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/military/0302humanitaction.pdf> [Vaux]. A conference on this
topic in 2001 found “no consensus amongst participants at the workshop on the way forward, and how aid agencies
could best address the use of private security companies”: Feinstein International Famine Center and Alert
International, “The Politicisation of Humanitarian Action and Staff Security: The Use of Private Security Companies
by Humanitarian Agencies” (International Workshop Summary Report, Tufts University, Boston, Massachusetts,
USA, 23-24 April 2001) at 5, online: <http://www.sces.msh-paris.fr/Tuftsreport.pdf> [Feinstein International
Famine Center].
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between classical humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality, and the
imperatives of delivering humanitarian aid in the complex security environments of today.
Part I of this paper examines the historical approach to protection of humanitarian actors during armed
conflict and occupation, and the shift that took place after the Cold War, with an increase in noninternational ethnic-based armed conflicts, failed and failing states, and a renaissance of insurgency-based
warfare. The reasons behind the increased security risks to humanitarian actors in these contemporary
manifestations of armed conflict are explored along with the legal response of the international
community.
Part II identifies the alternative approaches that have been taken in the last two decades to both the
delivery of humanitarian assistance, and ensuring the security of those delivering such aid, in order to
situate the use of private security by humanitarian organizations within the menu of available options. The
main strengths and weaknesses of alternatives are described, as well as the rationale cited by leading
humanitarian organizations for opting among these approaches.
Part III analyzes the potential consequences of humanitarian actors hiring private security contractors for
defensive armed protection under international humanitarian law. The focus of this analysis is with
respect to their protected status and humanitarian access. Finally, this paper concludes with preliminary
recommendations to manage some of the risks involved in humanitarian organizations hiring private
security companies.

II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT & MODERN CHALLENGES
Humanitarian organizations exist to alleviate suffering during, and in the aftermath of, armed conflict. As
a result, they inevitably operate in dangerous situations where their personnel are at risk of being harmed.
In order for these organizations to do their job, humanitarian personnel, premises, and materiel must be
protected. After describing the historical consent-based approach to delivering humanitarian aid, the
implications of the changing nature of armed conflict on security for humanitarian aid delivery are
explored.

A. HISTORICAL APPROACH TO PROTECTION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTORS
A great deal has changed since the birth of the modern humanitarian movement in 1859 when Henry
Dunant, who would go on to create the Red Cross, witnessed the suffering of the Battle of Solferino. 4
During the international armed conflicts of the Westphalian state-centric world order, humanitarian
organizations relied on the consent, goodwill, and assurances of national militaries to protect relief
workers. Safe passage agreements, together with clear identification, generally helped to ensure the safety
of humanitarian actors in the field.
Almost 150 years after the Battle of Solferino, Dunant’s International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) remains firmly committed to a classical approach to protecting its humanitarian personnel, based
on the negotiated consent of parties to the armed conflict. The reasons are both pragmatic and principled.
Consent of the parties is viewed by the ICRC both as a basis for ensuring security of its personnel and to
4

See Hans Haug, Humanity for All: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Henry Dunant
Institute Berne: Paul Haupt Berne Publishers, 1993) at 27.

4

Humanitarian Assistance & The Private Security Debate:
An International Humanitarian Law Perspective

On the Edges of Conflict

respect its neutral and impartial mandate: “[i]t is very dangerous if not impossible to organize a largescale relief effort in secret or against the wishes of a fighting party. The ICRC operates on the principle of
neutrality, which means that in theory, and in fact 99 percent of the time, it does not allow any weapons in
the vicinity of its operations. [T]he ICRC normally negotiates the terms of its access for its unarmed relief
efforts. . . . [I]t is all too often the fighting parties with their weapons that control the extent of, and nature
of, humanitarian relief.”5 The remaining “1%” of the time where the ICRC has departed from its general
policy against armed protection will be explored below.
Other humanitarian actors that emerged after WWII, and in particular, after the end of the Cold War, have
not been as stringent in requiring state consent before initiating humanitarian relief efforts. This was most
pronounced with Dr. Bernard Kouchner’s sans frontierism movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s
where “Kouchner and others asserted the right to intervene for humanitarian purposes whether or not
governmental permissions were granted.”6 This emergence of a willingness to intervene without the
consent of the state or parties to the conflict affords primacy to the humanitarian needs of the civilian
populace over state sovereignty and, perhaps, principles of neutrality and impartiality. Where
humanitarian action is pursued in this manner, the security of humanitarian personnel can no longer
depend on the assurances and goodwill of the state or parties to the conflict. Unwillingness or inability of
the parties to guarantee the safety of humanitarian personnel and materiel creates the impetus for
alternatives approaches to enhancing security of humanitarian actors. However, the call for humanitarian
action regardless of state consent is only one of many factors that have driven the need for alternative
security arrangements for humanitarians.

B. CHANGING NATURE OF MODERN ARMED CONFLICT & HUMANITARIAN ACTORS
Non-international armed conflicts, including ethnically-motivated attacks, and the growth of insurgency
warfare has tragically cost many humanitarians their lives. These contemporary manifestations of armed
conflict have taken place alongside a significant proliferation of the number and scope of humanitarian
organizations. Estimates put the number of people assisted by non-governmental organizations at two
hundred and fifty million,7 and the “total value of assistance delivered by NGOs now outweighs that
disbursed by the UN system”. 8 Humanitarian actors “regularly enter high-threat locations, arriving on
scene before the military and remaining after the military departs”.9
The foundational assumptions of the historical protection afforded to humanitarian actors are in serious
jeopardy. Consent of the parties to a conflict historically involved the ICRC negotiating with
representatives of two or more states, both of which had ratified basic international humanitarian law
5

David P. Forsythe & Barbara Ann J. Rieffler-Flanagan, The International Committee of the Red Cross: A Neutral
Humanitarian Actor (London & New York: Routledge, 2007) at 57 [emphasis added] [Forsythe].

6

Sheri Fink, “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: A Decade of Promises” in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., The Pulse
of Humanitarian Assistance (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007) 22 at 34 [Fink].
7

Major Lisa L. Turner & Major Lynn G. Norton, “Civilians at the Tip of the Spear” (2001) 51 Air Force Law
Review 1 at 14 [Turner & Norton].
8

Thomas G. Weiss, “The UN's Prevention Pipe-Dream”, (1996) 14 Berkeley Journal of International Law 423 at
431 [Weiss].
9

Turner & Norton, supra note 7 at 14.
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treaties. While there are notable exceptions to this before the end of the Cold War, it remained the
dominant conceptual model during this period.
The assumptions underlying the consent-based approach to security for humanitarian actors substantially
eroded after the end of the Cold War. In the five years following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, at least
seventy-nine out of eighty-two armed conflicts were non-international armed conflicts, involving state
militaries and a litany of non-state armed groups.10 During this period, NGOs disbursed approximately
US$8-10 billion in development aid, half earmarked for emergency relief. This represented a six-fold
increase in humanitarian activity over the prior decade. 11
Among the serious challenges that this new reality posed to humanitarian actors was the difficulty of
identifying representatives of non-state armed groups with which to negotiate humanitarian access (many
of whom did not have recognizable command structures), a lack of knowledge or respect for the protected
status of humanitarian personnel under international humanitarian law, and the challenge of navigating
the often complex politics of a multiplicity of non-state armed groups in a given space. Compounding the
difficulties, Mary Ellen O’Connell observes that “[r]ebel groups have been known to dishonor agreements
intentionally to create new occasions to negotiate. These groups believe that negotiating with international
aid organizations enhances their status.”12
In addition to these challenges, many non-international armed conflicts involved ethnically-motivated
attacks on civilians, such that the delivery of relief assistance was viewed as an opposing factor to be
confronted. 13 Indeed, “where the objective is to obliterate a particular group (ethnic or otherwise),
impartial humanitarian intervention is difficult to achieve.”14
An even more fundamental challenge to the consent-based approach to humanitarian security arose with
the problem of failed and failing states. Somalia was a watershed, both because of the number of
humanitarian actors involved and because of the complex security situation that this failed state presented.
Between 1991 and 1993 over fifty non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participated in humanitarian
relief in Somalia.15
Without any central authority in Somalia with which to negotiate humanitarian access, the ICRC was
forced to decide between refusing to provide humanitarian assistance or obtaining alternative security for
its humanitarian personnel to stave off a catastrophe. The ICRC chose the latter. In a recent account of
10

United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994), cited in Weiss, supra note 8 at 427.
11

Weiss, supra note 8 at 431.

12

Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War on Terror?” (2005) 43
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 435 at 442 [O’Connell].
13

More recently, civilians and humanitarian personnel alike have been attacked and killed in Darfur, Sudan: see
Fink, supra note 6 at 33.
14

Lindsay Jill Suttenberg, ”Recent Developments: Curing the Humanitarian Crisis: Resolution 1502” (2005) 4
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 187 at 194 [Suttenberg].
15

As an indicator of the growth of humanitarian organizations, “during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, already more than
400 NGOs participated in the humanitarian relief effort. Currently [2005], UNHCR efforts are implemented by more
than 600 NGOs, receiving almost $270 million, more than one fifth of UNHCR’s annual budget.” Liesbet Heyse,
Choosing the Lesser Evil: Understanding Decision Making in Humanitarian Aid NGOs (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,
2006) at 3 [citations omitted] [Heyse].
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this departure from the ICRC’s general policy against armed protection, David Forsythe and Barbara
Rieffler-Flanagan write:
For the first time in its history, the ICRC took the decision to operate as part of a military
mission, because that was the only way, in [the] view of the top decision-makers of the
organization, that widespread starvation could be checked in Somalia. Previously the ICRC had
required even military transports carrying its relief goods to be weapons-free, even as the
organization then turned and hired local security forces to guard its facilities and resources on
the ground.16

In addition to abandoning the consent-based approach in Somalia, since it was rendered moot, the ICRC
also retreated from another traditional practice of clearly marking its vehicles with the Red Cross emblem,
because “[r]ather than providing security from attack, the emblem had become a target for attacks.”17
The ICRC was not alone in securing alternative security arrangements in Somalia. Even more
controversial, other humanitarian organizations associated themselves with different tribal factions in
order to bring relief aid to civilians – an indication that the principle of impartiality may have been
compromised by reliance on security personnel holding vested interests in the conflict. Those
organizations that did not hire local armed guards reportedly lost up to 50% of aid supplies. Other
Western aid representatives that had hired local guards were threatened when they attempted to terminate
the arrangement, suggesting a “protection racket” had been established as part of the war economy. 18
More recently, insurgency warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq has presented new challenges for
humanitarians. While counter-insurgency warfare is not “new”, 19 the presence of a large number of
humanitarian actors in the midst of this type of conflict is a relatively recent phenomenon. For example,
as Andrew Bearpark explains, in Iraq during 2003-2004 there was the “tragic bombing of the UN, and a
few weeks later you had the attack on the ICRC office and the kidnappings and murders of individual aid
workers, with the tragic death of Margaret Hassan from CARE as one example. There was a total change
in atmosphere – from being neutral do-gooders, the aid workers had suddenly become perceived as part of
the war environment, and that’s where the need for security arose.”20

C. UNDERSTANDING THE INCREASED RISK TO HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL
The combined effect of these complex modern security environments with the increasing number and
scope of humanitarian actors has been, in some cases, deadly. Sean Greenaway and Andrew Harris
observe that “[i]n virtually every part of the world, those providing aid to distressed populations have
been robbed, beaten, raped, abducted and murdered . . . Only 6% of those interviewed – which included
16

Forsythe, supra note 5 at 70-71.

17

Ibid., at 72.

18

Vaux, supra note 3 at 23.

19

“Rebels in the American Revolution took thirteen years to defeat the British armed forces and adopt the
Constitution. American armed forces took seventeen years to pacify the Philippines. British armed forces took
twelve years to subdue Malaysian communist guerrillas.” See Commander Albert S. Janin, “Engaging CivilianBelligerents Leads to Self-Defense/Protocol I Marriage” (2007) Army Law Review 82.
20

“Interview with Andrew Bearpark” (2006) 863 International Review of the Red Cross 449 at 450 [Bearpark].
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development workers – recorded no security problems at their work location.”21 Greenaway and Harris
identify four types of security risks facing humanitarian personnel: accident, criminality, banditry, and
targeting.
Accidents encompass “being caught in crossfire, being in the wrong place at the wrong time, falling
victim to landmines, or aviation and road accidents and the like”; criminality, they say is “largely selfexplanatory”; banditry “refers to armed factions seeking to plunder aid agency assets with an economic
value in order to feed their war machine or for personal gain . . . [h]ostage-taking for ransom”; and
targeting “refers to deliberate attacks or threats aimed at an agency in order to disrupt its activities or to
influence the behavior of third party, mainly international, actors”.22 Based on the state of affairs
prevailing in 1998, Greenaway and Harris considered “that, apart from accident, the criminality and
banditry categories predominate” but “[t]argeting, however, probably constitutes the greatest threat to
humanitarian action in the instances where it occurs.”23
In 1996, 153 delegates of the ICRC were affected by a variety of “security incidents” in which they were
killed or wounded – a lower figure than 1993/1994 when attacks on ICRC delegates peaked. 24 A decade
later in 2006, the ICRC reported three deaths of staff members during the year, in Haiti, Senegal, and
Sudan.25 Whether this represents a stable downward trend is uncertain.
Statistics maintained by the United Nations of attacks on their personnel are by far the most detailed over
time, and offer some insights in to the types of security incidents that humanitarian personnel are affected
by in the field:
Over the past decade, threats against the safety and security of UN personnel have escalated at
an unprecedented pace. Forced to operate in increasingly dangerous environments and in
complex emergencies, the mortality and distress rates of field staff have increased dramatically.
From January 1992 to April 2003, 220 civilian UN staff members lost their lives through the
deliberate machinations of perpetrators, only 22 of whom have been brought to justice . . .
Between January 1994 and October 2002, 74 incidents involving hostage-taking or kidnapping
involving 262 staff occurred – eight in 2002 in separate incidents in Somalia, the Sudan and
Guyana. . . . This list does not include the growing number of incidents of rape, sexual assault,
armed robbery, car-jacking, attack on humanitarian convoys and operations and harassment
perpetrated upon UN staff. 26

The reasons behind these statistics are far more complex than the numbers reveal. In addition to the
contribution of modern forms of armed conflict, discussed above, the following factors are believed to
have increased the security risks facing humanitarian actors in recent years:
21

Sean Greenaway & Andrew J. Harris, “Humanitarian Security: Challenges and Responses” (Paper presented to
the Forging Peace Conference, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 13-15 March 1998), online:
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/echoanser.html> [Greenaway & Harris].
22

Ibid.

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid.

25

International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2006 (Geneva, ICRC, 2007) at 8.

26

Nuchhi Currier, “Protecting the Protectors – Strengthening Staff Security: Priorities and Challenges” (2003) 2
U.N. Chronicle 5, online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2003/issue2/0203p5.html> [Currier].
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Lack of situational awareness and local knowledge among humanitarian personnel in their initial
period of deployment;27
Competition between humanitarian organizations, resulting in inexperienced staff in the field and
increased risk-taking;28
Targeting of civilians by combatants, with aid workers viewed as a threat to achieving this
objective;29
Targeting of humanitarian workers directly because they are not perceived as neutral, due to their
foreign nationality, perceived cooperation / relationship with opposing military forces, or their
human rights advocacy;30
Targeting of humanitarian workers to discredit the ability of the occupying authority to protect
civilians, 31 “a desire to influence a third party, force withdrawal of the agency, or invite greater
force in the conflict”;32
Lack of respect for the protected status of humanitarian workers under international humanitarian
law;33 and,
Economic motivations of belligerents or “criminal profiteering”34 to obtain materiel and supplies
directly, or because the aid, if delivered, would negatively affect their economic power in the
conflict.35

D. LEGAL RESPONSE TO ATTACKS ON HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL
The legal response of the international community to the post-Cold War rise in attacks on U.N. and
humanitarian workers has consisted primarily of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel (U.N. Safety Convention), a series of largely reactive U.N. Security Council
Resolutions in response to attacks, and the affirmation in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court that intentional attacks on humanitarian workers constitute war crimes. A detailed analysis of the
legal protection afforded to humanitarian personnel provides important insights into the contemporary
view of this class of protected persons under international law.

27

“A study of deaths among aid workers showed that most occur within the first three months of arrival in a
country, rather than after they have spent time and made enough mistakes to make some enemies on one side of a
conflict or another or have angered some black marketers or local authorities.” See Barbara Smith, “The Dangers of
Aid Word” in Yael Danieli, ed., Sharing the Front Line and the Back Hills – International Protectors and
Providers: Peacekeepers, Humanitarian Aid Workers and the Media in the Midst of Crisis (Amityville, NY:
Baywood Publishing, 2002) 171 at 175.
28

Greenaway & Harris, supra note 21.

29

Suttenberg, supra note 14 at 194.

30

Bearpark, supra note 20 at 450; Vaux, supra note 3 at 12; Suttenberg, supra note 14 at 193.

31

Suttenberg, supra note 14 at 193-4.

32

Currier, supra note 26.

33

Ibid.

34

Ibid.

35

Suttenberg, supra note 14 at 194.
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First, the 1994 U.N. Safety Convention was adopted in response to the “growing number of deaths and
injuries resulting from deliberate attacks against United Nations and associated personnel”.36 The
Convention was drafted with a view to ensuring consistency with international humanitarian law, such
that it “shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council as an
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel
are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed
conflict applies”.37
The most important provision of the Convention for humanitarian organizations concerns the definition of
“associated personnel” in Article (1)(b)(iii). The term is defined as:
Persons deployed by a humanitarian non-governmental organization or agency under an agreement with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations or with a specialized agency or with the International Atomic
Energy Agency, to carry out activities in support of the fulfillment of the mandate of a United Nations
operation . . .38

In other words, the U.N. Safety Convention is narrowly focused on U.N. operations and protects only
those humanitarian NGOs that are specifically engaged to support such missions. This is, nevertheless,
potentially a substantial number of organizations. For example, the UNHCR alone implements its
programs through the work of over 600 NGOs.39
In addition to affirming the protected status of these “associated” humanitarian organizations under
international humanitarian law, the U.N. Safety Convention requires States Parties to criminalize attacks
on humanitarians and assist in prosecuting offenders.40
Notably, the U.N. Safety Convention states: “[n]othing in this Convention shall be construed so as to
derogate from the right to act in self-defence”41 However, it also provides that associated personnel are
required to “[r]efrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and international nature
of their duties”.42 The Convention goes on to specify that it should not be taken to affect the applicability
of international humanitarian law. 43 As we will see in Part III, the allowable scope of self-defence and
meaning of impartiality are critical concepts under international humanitarian law that serve to,
respectively, support and detract from the ability of humanitarian actors to engage private security to meet
their perceived protection needs.
The second legal response to attacks on humanitarian organizations has been more broadly formulated
than the U.N. Safety Convention. A series of U.N. Security Council resolutions reacting to attacks on
36

Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, preamble, online: United
Nations <http://www.un.org/law/cod/safety.htm> [U.N. Safety Convention].
37

Ibid., art. 2(2).

38

Ibid., art. 1(b)(iii).

39

Heyse, supra note 15 at 3.

40

U.N. Safety Convention, supra note 36, arts. 7, 9.

41

Ibid., art. 21.

42

Ibid., art. 6(1)(b).

43

Ibid., art. 20(1).
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humanitarian personnel over the years have grown increasingly insistent and specific, albeit frequently to
little avail.44 In 1992, Resolution 751 on Somalia did little more than call for “full respect for the security
and safety of the personnel of humanitarian organizations”. 45 By 2000, Resolution 1296 was far more
specific in terms of the obligations on state and non-state actors to provide both for the safety and access
of humanitarian organizations during armed conflict:
The United Nations Security Council
* * * * *
Underlines the importance of safe and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to civilians
in armed conflicts, calls upon all parties concerned, including neighbouring States, to cooperate
fully with the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator and United Nations agencies in
providing such access, invites States and the Secretary-General to bring to its attention
information regarding the deliberate denial of such access in violation of international law,
where such denial may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and, in this regard,
expresses its willingness to consider such information and, when necessary, to adopt appropriate
steps;46
* * * * *
Reiterates its call to all parties concerned, including non-State parties, to ensure the safety,
security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, as well as
personnel of humanitarian organizations . . . 47

As with the U.N. Safety Convention, Resolution 1296 reiterated “the importance for humanitarian
organizations to uphold the principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity in their humanitarian
activities”.48
More recently, Resolution 1502 was passed in response to the August 19, 2003 bombing of the U.N.
headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq. Lindsay Suttenberg argues that “with the passage of Security Council
Resolution 1502, the United Nations attempted to strike a balance between maintaining humanitarian
organizations’ neutrality in the eyes of the world and ensuring their safety while in the field”. 49
Resolution 1502 is very similar to Resolution 1296 in terms of recognizing the protected status and right
of humanitarian access of humanitarian personnel, as well as the need for neutrality and impartiality. 50
However, it explicitly mentions an additional constraint on these organizations, namely, “the obligation of
all humanitarian personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel to observe and respect the
laws of the country in which they are operating, in accordance with international law and the Charter of

44

In addition to those cited below, see U.N. Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999), 17 September 1999, paras. 78 (on the protection of civilians in armed conflict).
45

U.N. Security Council Resolution 751 (1992), 24 April 1992, para. 14.

46

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000), 19 April 2000, para. 8.

47

Ibid., para. 12.

48

Ibid., para. 11.

49

Suttenberg, supra note 14 at 189.

50

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1502 (2003), 26 August 2003, preamble, paras. 3-4 (protection of United
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the United Nations”. 51 This language betrays an important compromise between states of operation, on
the one hand, and intervening states and humanitarian organizations, on the other: rights of protected
status and humanitarian access in Resolution 1502 are tied to (1) respect for local law – at least to the
extent it is not inconsistent with the U.N. Charter and international law; and, (2) the principles of
neutrality and impartiality. 52 These imperatives have potentially significant implications for the practice
of humanitarian organizations hiring private security contractors, as discussed in Part III.
Finally, under international criminal law, intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations,
materiel, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance mission constitutes a war crime in both
international and non-international armed conflict. There are two requirements related to the character of
the humanitarian mission: (1) it must be in accordance with the U.N. Charter, and (2) intentionally
attacking humanitarian personnel and objects is only a war crime “as long as they are entitled to the
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict”. 53 In other
words, if the protected status of humanitarian personnel or objects as civilians is suspended or lost (as
discussed in Part III), then any intentional attack will not constitute a war crime. Thus, protected status is
a pivotal concept in this aspect of the legal protection regime for humanitarians.

II. ALTERNATIVES TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE & SECURITY
Responding to the complexity and instability of modern armed conflict, two trends with respect to
humanitarian assistance and security may be observed. First, humanitarian organizations no longer have a
monopoly on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in difficult security environments. Other actors,
including state armed forces and, more rarely, private military and security companies now deliver
humanitarian aid directly. Second, many humanitarian organizations have managed their security risks by
adopting an array of new, and sometimes controversial, approaches to protection.
As a result of these twin phenomena, there has been both an expansion of the actors delivering
humanitarian assistance, and the actors providing security for that assistance, as summarized in the table
below. The implications of these humanitarian assistance and security combinations have a certain
impact in considering the security alternatives available to humanitarian organizations.

51

Ibid., preamble.

52

It is, of course, routine for insurgents who have kidnapped and/or murdered humanitarian aid workers to claim,
without any evidence, that those workers were spies for a foreign government to which they have committed
themselves to destroy by any means necessary.
53

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, arts. 8(2)(b)(iii)
(international armed conflict), 8(2)(e)(iii) (non-international armed conflict) [Rome Statute]; Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone in Report the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000), art. 4(b). See also, Elements of Crimes, International Criminal
Court, ICC-ASP/1/3, at 131, 149.
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TABLE 1 –HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE & SECURITY MATRIX
APPROACHES TO SECURITY / PROTECTION

ACTORS DELIVERING
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Humanitarian Organizations

State Armed Forces

•

Withdraw, or never enter, due to security risk

•

Utilize “soft security”: training, policies, infrastructure,
collaboration with other humanitarian organizations

•

Engage state armed forces

•

Engage non-state armed groups

•

Engage populace/community

•

Integrate in-house security officers;

•

Local guards for (un)armed protection

•

Private security company for (un)armed protection

•

Armed security from state armed forces

•

State armed forces

•

Private military and security companies

Private Military and Security Companies

After exploring the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance by state armed forces and private
military/security companies as independent actors, the security alternatives facing humanitarian
organizations themselves are considered.

A. OTHER ACTORS DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
State and non-state actors that specialize in providing security have undertaken a greater role in directly
delivering humanitarian assistance themselves, without necessarily involving humanitarian organizations
at all. Pursuing counter-insurgency doctrines or the so-called “3-D” model (Defence, Diplomacy, and
Development), state armed forces are increasingly involved in providing humanitarian relief aid as well as
longer-term development assistance. Less frequent, but notable, is the contracting out of humanitarian aid
to private military and security companies themselves. While national armed forces and private
military/security companies bring a particular expertise in security, it is not surprising that their delivery
of humanitarian assistance has been criticized by incumbent humanitarian organizations.
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1. STATE ARMED FORCES
The delivery of humanitarian assistance directly by state armed forces has been celebrated as a form of
humanitarian intervention, but also decried. One side of the critique assails the “militarization of the
humanitarian space”, while the other is concerned with the “humanitarianization of the military space.”
On the positive side, military involvement in humanitarian assistance has been viewed as “an indication
that the community of states is finally getting serious about assisting and protecting vulnerable civilian
populations.”54 Indeed, traditional humanitarian organizations have opted in some cases to wait until the
security environment has improved before intervening; whereas, state armed forces engaged in peace
enforcement missions, at least theoretically, do not wait as long to act. However, in delivering
humanitarian assistance, intervening armed forces have struggled to “maintain the fiction that they are not
a belligerent force.”55 Consistent with the ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law,
combatants delivering humanitarian aid are not afforded protected status as humanitarian personnel. 56
On the other hand, some humanitarian activists are uneasy about an enhanced role for state armed forces
in delivering aid, arguing that “as a matter of principle and practice, humanitarian action is – and should
remain – first and foremost civilian in character”.57 This concern is linked to the principle of nondiscriminatory delivery of humanitarian aid. A distinction is made by some with respect to long-term
development assistance, which may be partial and selective.
There is no doubt that many state armed forces often now view humanitarian and development assistance
as part of their military strategy. While the Somalia mission in the early 1990s brought into question
whether military forces should be involved in humanitarian assistance, 58 that reticence has been
definitively set aside in the counterinsurgency tactics employed in Iraq and Afghanistan only a decade
later. Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps has said, “[w]e see humanitarian tasks as a fullfledged military mission”. 59 Likewise, Major Lisa L. Turner and Major Lynn G. Norton have recognized
that combining military capabilities with humanitarian assistance is a “force multiplier”.60 As a result of
this current view, the delivery of humanitarian assistance directly by, or with the support of, state armed
forces is now “more or less inevitable”.61

54

Larry Minear, The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002)
at 104 [Minear].
55

Major J.D. Godwin, “NATO’s Role in Peace Operations: Reexamining the Treaty after Bosnia and Kosovo”
(1999) 160 Military Law Review 1 at 29.
56

See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 2 at 105.

57

Minear, supra note 54 at 105.

58

Greenaway & Harris, supra note 21.

59

Quoted in Minear, supra note 54 at 99.

60

Turner & Norton, supra note 7 at 14.

61
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2. PRIVATE MILITARY/SECURITY COMPANIES
While it has received relatively little publicity to date, private military/security companies have received
contracts to directly deliver humanitarian assistance, based on their capability to rapidly deploy and
provide their own security. These firms see business opportunities in a vast array of operations, including
“state-building, supporting and even providing humanitarian and disaster relief, which includes logistics,
communications and energy services.”62 These firms have also reportedly advised and provided
protection for displaced populations.63
In the early 1990s, MPRI was reportedly hired by the U.S. State Department to provide humanitarian
relief to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union. The firm is said to have shipped over
US$380 million in humanitarian supplies by 1994 to the region. 64 While current examples of private
military and security companies delivering humanitarian aid have not been widely publicized, it is a
phenomenon that bears monitoring.

B. ENSURING SAFETY OF HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL
As discussed in Part I, humanitarian organizations have widely proliferated since the end of the Cold War.
To enter or remain in the business of delivering humanitarian aid in modern armed conflict situations,
these organizations have been compelled to consider an array of alternative approaches to protecting their
personnel, property, and materiel. In short, many are no longer content to simply rely on their protected
status under international humanitarian law or the traditional consent-based approach to protection,
discussed earlier.
In confronting today’s complex security climate, humanitarian organizations have a diverse menu of
alternatives to consider, including:
• Withdraw, or never enter, due to unacceptable risk;
• Utilize “soft security”: training, policies, procedures, security information management,
infrastructure, collaboration with other organizations;
• Engage state armed forces to mitigate security risks;
• Engage non-state armed groups to mitigate security risks;
• Engage populace/community to mitigate security risks (“acceptance” strategy);
• Integrate in-house security officers;
• Hire local guards to provide (un)armed protection;
• Hire a private security company to provide (un)armed protection; and
• Align with a state to obtain armed security from state armed forces.

62

Bearpark, supra note 20 at 451.

63

Vaux, supra note 3 at 8.

64

Joni Balter, “Charities Urged to Try to Keep Donations from Going Overseas”, Seattle Times (December 17,
1994) A1, cited in Juan Carlos Zarate, “The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security
Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder” (1998) 34 Stanford Journal of International Law 75 at
105. See also Major Todd S. Milliard, “Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate
Private Military Companies” (2003) 176 Military Law Review 1 at n. 65.
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Humanitarian organizations share the common goal of “safe, effective delivery of relief and provision of
temporary protection to those in need”. 65 However, many organizations disagree on which of these
security alternatives actually satisfy this objective, both in the short-term and long-term.
The threshold security question that all humanitarian organizations face is whether to enter a conflict or
post-conflict area at all. While humanitarian organizations have a responsibility to deliver relief, they also
have obligations to protect their staff and conduct due diligence on the security risks involved. The
potential consequences of refusing to enter a theatre of operations to deliver humanitarian assistance is the
damning observation that “[t]he resulting loss of life in the affected population is significant – both from
lack of access to relief programs and from the protection international agencies offer as ‘witnesses’ to
deter atrocities.”66 Typically, the option of withdrawal, suspension of operations or refusal to enter the
area where humanitarian relief is required will be based on the failure of parties to the conflict to provide
a secure environment and an unwillingness or inability of the relevant organization to pursue alternatives
to mitigate the security risks involved. In the case of long-standing humanitarian organizations,
fundamental philosophies about the use of armed security loom larger than the immediate conflict taking
place. However, as witnessed in Somalia, there are exceptions to every such policy.
Between refusal to enter an area of operations and resorting to external security options, there is a range
of “soft” approaches to security that humanitarian organizations have adopted. Security training,
procedures, and awareness have a role in mitigating security risks. Many larger humanitarian
organizations have become increasingly apt at developing internal capacity in this area, in addition to
bringing in outside security consultants. However, some organizations lack the expertise and information
to adequately provide such training. Coordination between humanitarian organizations, including with
respect to evacuation planning, is one approach to overcoming these shortcomings. 67
“Engagement” is a broad category of proactive approaches pursued by humanitarian organizations to
mitigate security risks. To this end, various humanitarian organizations directly consult and negotiate with
state armed forces, non-state armed groups, and the local populace. For some organizations, engagement
or “acceptance” as a security strategy is intended to overcome the need for physical “hard” security
alternatives.
A strategy of engaging state armed forces can include consulting and sharing information with local,
foreign, and international military commanders. For example, the U.S. military has worked with
humanitarian organizations through the Combined Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Somalia, Haiti,
and northern Iraq. Daily meetings between commanders and representatives from relevant humanitarian
organizations and NGOs take place with the CMOC.68 Humanitarian organizations will have varying
degrees of comfort with such collaboration, depending on the stricture with which they balance security
concerns with the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence.
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Greenaway & Harris, supra note 21.
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Pragmatic considerations of obtaining access to contested areas of operations have long led the U.N. and
ICRC to negotiate access agreements with various non-state armed groups. As Nuchhi Currier has noted,
for these agreements to succeed, they must be “transparent, neutral and a humanitarian necessity”.69 The
challenges with obtaining such agreements in contemporary armed conflict situations as part of the
consent-based strategy have been canvassed in Part I.
While engaging the populace70 as a security strategy is considered by some to be the alternative “closest
to humanitarian principles”, its effectiveness may be quite limited. To succeed in providing timely
information to humanitarian actors and foster community protection, this approach requires early and
sustained effort by experienced humanitarian personnel.71
Going beyond these “soft” security alternatives, humanitarian organizations have at least three external
“hard” security options: (1) local “guards”, (2) state armed forces, and (3) foreign private security
contractors. The decision of a humanitarian organization to rely on any of these alternatives for the
defensive protection of personnel, property, and materiel is inextricably linked to the broader debate about
the use of armed protection by humanitarians.

1. THE ARMED PROTECTION DEBATE
The use of armed protection – delivered by local guards, state armed forces, or private security companies
– has divided the humanitarian community.
On one side of the debate, organizations like the ICRC and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) have resisted
the use of armed protection. The ICRC’s philosophy is that security is best achieved through adhering to
its core principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. The ICRC’s Report on the Use of Armed
Protection for Humanitarian Assistance states: “the ability to deliver humanitarian assistance and to carry
out humanitarian activities in violent situations is a product first and foremost of our ethical and
professional standards and the way we conduct ourselves. It is not a function of armed escorts and flakjackets”.72 As a result of this approach, the ICRC has had to temporarily suspended operations (as in
Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of Congo) due to security risks that the organization was unable to
manage within the confines of its general policy against armed protection.73 MSF has also resisted armed
protection by “robustly defending the right of intervention on the principle[s] of impartiality and
neutrality”.74
Conversely, organizations like CARE and the World Food Programme (WFP) have extensively used
armed escorts in transporting aid to populations in need. An International Alert study found that these
69

Currier, supra note 26.
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Feinstein International Famine Center, supra note 3 at 3.
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armed escorts are usually provided by the host government, but in some cases where the state authorities
lack effective control these organizations have hired private security companies to provide armed
protection to aid convoys.75

2. SECURITY BY STATE ARMED FORCES
Reliance on state armed forces for close protection has been resisted by humanitarian organizations on the
basis that it undermines impartiality, neutrality, and independence. 76 For example, with respect to the Red
Cross, the Commentaries on Additional Protocol I (AP I) take the view that “the neutrality of the emblem
should preclude them from being escorted by members of the armed forces”. 77
Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini argue that the “use of military protection in support of humanitarian
operations should only occur when there is no comparable civilian alternative”. 78 There is also concern
that being in such close proximity to military personnel will undermine the effectiveness of the protected
status of humanitarian actors as civilians under international humanitarian law.79
From the perspective of state armed forces, Major Lisa Turner and Major Lynn Norton highlight two
competing views on providing protection to humanitarian organizations. On one hand, while noting the
independence of humanitarian organizations, military commanders may see a strategic advantage in being
able to influence humanitarian action – doing so through logistical support, security, and
communications. On the other hand, requests for security by humanitarian organizations may be viewed
as “unreasonable, unnecessary, and untenable in their effects upon the military mission”. 80

3. LOCAL GUARDS AS PRIVATE SECURITY
In an attempt to balance security concerns with principles of neutrality and impartiality, some
humanitarian organizations have hired local “guards” – armed and unarmed – to escort personnel and
supply convoys, or to provide security at fixed locations.
An Alert International study found that American NGOs typically hire local guards to deter banditry by
providing (usually) unarmed protection at fixed sites, such as warehouses. 81 However, there are instances
where these “flashlight and radio” guards at various sites are able to call-in armed response teams on
short notice. The study noted:
75
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76
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Another disturbing issue, of which aid agencies seem to be unaware, is that the local company
with its unarmed guards may have the facility to call upon armed back-up (which might even
include armoured cars and rocket-launchers). . . . Aid staff might be surprised to find that in the
event of a security incident there could be a rapid escalation and the use of sophisticated
weapons.82

Many of the non-governmental organizations in the Alert International study expressed a greater
willingness to use armed guards to “ride shotgun” for convoys in unstable areas.83 Even the ICRC (in
Somalia and the Northern Caucasus) and MSF (in Somalia and Pakistan) have both reportedly hired local
guards to escort aid convoys.84
The use of local guards has been a preferred security alternative among certain humanitarian
organizations for several reasons. Locally hired security guards are presumed to be knowledgeable about
the players, politics, and language of the area of operations. It is assumed that locally hired guards
promote the neutrality and independence of humanitarian organizations because they are presumed not to
be affiliated with state armed forces or non-state armed groups, who may otherwise have to be relied upon
to provide protection.
However, there are several serious concerns with the hiring of local individuals to provide armed or
unarmed protection to humanitarian organizations. Local personnel may have ethnic or tribal affiliations
with parties to the conflict.85 James Cockayne has characterized the ICRC’s approach in Somalia as
building “a small army out of a patchwork of different clansmen, in an effort to ensure humanitarian
access for aid convoys”. 86 At the time that a Western humanitarian organization is attempting to initially
establish its operations, local affiliations will be very difficult to fully appreciate. As a result, the image
of the humanitarian organization may be tarnished by hiring unsavory local characters as “guards”, or
even worse, the organization may unwittingly associate itself with a party to the conflict and, thus,
become the target of attacks.
A second set of concerns over hiring local guards is the broader impact of this practice. There is the risk
that hiring local guards will result in a localized “arms race” because in order to provide credible
deterrence, local guards must be equipped to repel local security threats.87 Further, hiring local guards
may fuel the local war economy and encourage a protection racket. The lack of thought given to what
armed local guards will do to make a living after their contract terminates is problematic – there is a risk
that they will turn to criminality, or join one of the parties to the armed conflict.
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4. HIRING A PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY
The nature and extent to which humanitarian organizations hire private security companies remains
relatively unexplored. Neither the private military and security company literature88 nor industry surveys,
which suffer from poor response rates and are at too high a level of generalization,89 provide detailed
information on the prevalence of private security company usage by humanitarian organizations. Major
General Tim Cross has gone so far as to say that the practice of humanitarian organizations hiring private
security firms has “taken place under a veil of silence, in an ad hoc way”.90
Typically, statements about the use of private security firms by humanitarian organizations are very
general in nature, withholding the identity of the organization, firm and scope of the contract.91 For
example, Larry Minear states that “humanitarian organizations have contracted with international security
firms to provide protection for operations and personnel in places such as Sierra Leone, Angola and the
Congo”.92 Andrew Bearpark, who represents an industry association of British private security firms, has
noted that aid agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have resorted to private security companies.93
What is apparent is that private security companies are engaged in a wide range of activities for
humanitarian organizations, of which armed protection is likely a very small aspect. 94 The March 2002
Alert International study on the prevalence of private security companies being hired by aid
organizations, based on interviews with some of the leading international humanitarian organizations,
made the following findings:
In terms of aid agencies (non-governmental and UN), national and international private security
companies are being used for the protection of staff and premises. The most common services
provided are risk analysis, security training for staff, crisis management advice (e.g. regarding
kidnapping), undertaking security audits, and especially the provision of guards (mostly
unarmed) for site protection, notably of offices, warehouses and residences. Where as in the past
there have been instances in which aid agencies have hired personnel from a private security
company to serve as agency security officers, this practice nowadays seems to have stopped. In a
recent review of twenty aid agencies it was revealed that, while security management had, on the
whole, improved in recent years, by and large no policies existed for the use of private security
companies. Where some experience has been translated into guidelines, these have generally not
been formalised nor the ethical and management dimensions of using private security companies
been fully thought through.95
88
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A notable exception, U.K.-based ArmorGroup is a private security company that has been quite open
about working for humanitarian organizations. On a global basis, ArmorGroup has a client list that reads
like a “who’s who” of the humanitarian and development community, including: U.N. agencies, ECHO,
US Agency for International Development (USAID), DfID, ICRC, International Rescue Committee,
CARE, and Caritas.96
ArmorGroup has been quite vocal about the need for accountability for private security contractors and
claims that it does not seek immunity for its personnel, stating: “[i]t is also worrying that some companies
are calling for immunity [from prosecution] in Iraq. We don’t want immunity and we don’t need it. We
always go about our business within the laws of the countries where we work.”97
The demand for private security services by reputable “blue chip” clients like humanitarian organization
may exert a positive market force for such firms to ensure they maintain an excellent record for
international humanitarian law and human rights compliance. However, the strength of this incentive on
the private military/security industry is limited due to the relatively small portion of the market that such
clients comprise. 98
Furthermore, it is at least theoretically plausible that foreign private security contractors are more neutral
and impartial players than either locally hired guards or members of state armed forces.99 However, this
argument is becoming less persuasive with the widespread practice in recent years of private security
companies hiring an increasing percentage of local staff. For example, in Iraq, the ratio of expatriate to
local staff employed by private military and security companies is 1:10.100
Similar to the practice of hiring local guards, there are broader concerns about the impact in a given
theatre of operations of hiring private security contractors. Some argue that armed private security can
have the unintended consequence of increasing the security threat facing humanitarian organizations, both
since “the introduction of another armed faction inside an already unstable region would only increase the
probability of the use of armed force”, 101 and because the presence of armed personnel make the
protected personnel or assets more noticeable by belligerents or criminal elements.
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III. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IMPLICATIONS
The changing nature of armed conflict since the end of the Cold War together with the complex security
risks facing humanitarian organizations, and the shortcomings of relying on local guards or state armed
forces for protection, have combined to make the use of private security companies the least-worst
alternative for some humanitarian organizations. While the extent of the practice is difficult to assess, it is
clear that humanitarian organization have hired private security companies for a range of activities,
including, in certain cases, for armed defensive protection. The consequences of this trend in terms of the
rights and obligations of humanitarian actors under international humanitarian law have received little
attention to date.
In 1977 when the Additional Protocols were adopted, the use of private security firms as an alternative
means of ensuring security for humanitarian action was not envisaged. The post-Cold War expansion of
deliberately targeting humanitarian personnel, failed and failing states, and ethnic-based non-international
armed conflicts was similarly not in the minds of the framers. As a result, there is no explicit directive in
either the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocols as to whether humanitarian organizations may hire
unarmed or armed private security companies to provide protection for humanitarian personnel, property
or materiel. It is necessary to go back to first principles in order to address this issue.
The use of private security companies by humanitarian organizations raises several challenging questions
for international humanitarian law. Two threshold issues that must be addressed are:
•

Is the protected status of humanitarian personnel under international humanitarian law suspended
or lost if they use armed private security contractors?

•

Is humanitarian access to provide relief affected by the decision to hire a private security
company for armed protection of relief consignments?

A. PROTECTED STATUS
1. OBLIGATIONS TO RESPECT AND PROTECT HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL
Parties to an international armed conflict have a legal obligation to protect humanitarian relief
consignments and personnel under international humanitarian law. This has been recognized as a rule of
customary international law. 102 Article 70(4) of AP I provides that “[t]he Parties to the conflict shall
protect relief consignments and facilitate their rapid distribution”, while Article 71(2) of AP I states that
personnel participating in relief actions “shall be respected and protected”. 103 The Commentaries on
Article 70(4) of AP I follow the traditional consent-based approach to humanitarian security:
If the authorities do not have the means to ensure such protection, particularly if they cannot
prevent looting and diversion of relief consignments, the whole question whether the relief
action can continue is obviously put in jeopardy, first from the point of view of the donors, then
the Parties allowing the passage over their territory, and finally, and most of all, the adverse
Parties of the receiving Party.104
102
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Likewise, Article 71(2) of AP I confers only modest protection for humanitarian personnel, such that the
Parties to the conflict must “inform and instruct their armed forces not to attack such personnel.” 105
Banditry and riots by a starving population is a risk recognized in the Commentaries, and may be dealt
with by reliance on the local police force, if it is necessary and requested. 106
The relevant Party to an international armed conflict is also required to provide security and access to
civilian medical personnel where medical services are needed. 107 Additionally, “[i]f needed, all available
help shall be afforded to civilian medical personnel in an area where civilian medical services are
disrupted by reason of combat activity.”108
During a non-international armed conflict, the obligation to respect and protect humanitarian relief
personnel and consignments has been recognized under customary international law, despite the general
lack of treaty-based provisions analogous to those applicable to international armed conflicts.109 Article
9(1) of Additional Protocol II (AP II), however, explicitly states that medical personnel “shall be
respected and protected”. 110 Article 11(2) of AP II states that “[t]he protection to which medical units and
transports are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit hostile acts, outside their
humanitarian function”. 111

2. PROTECTED STATUS AS CIVILIANS
Humanitarian personnel are civilians under international humanitarian law and, thus, have protected
status, which grants them immunity from attack during international and non-international armed
conflicts.112 Persons denied civilian status under international humanitarian law are identified in Articles
4A(1); (2); (3); and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention 1949 and Article 43 of AP I; and, in those cases
where an individual’s status is in doubt, “that person shall be considered a civilian”.113 Humanitarian
personnel are clearly civilians. On the basis of Article 50(1) of AP I, security personnel accompanying
them should similarly be considered as having civilian status unless and until such time as they directly
participate in hostilities.
Protected status as a civilian subsists “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”. 114
A significant consequence of the suspension or loss of protected status is that the individual may legally
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be subject to attack.115 Consistent with this principle, as noted above, the ICRC study on customary
international humanitarian law has recognized that military personnel delivering humanitarian aid are not
afforded protected status as humanitarian personnel. 116
Unfortunately, the meaning of “direct participation in hostilities” remains complex and unsettled in
international humanitarian law, despite recent sustained attempts to arrive at a common interpretation of
this pivotal concept.117
Starting from first principles, the ICRC Commentaries to AP I state that direct participation “means acts
of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of
the enemy armed forces”,118 and that “[h]ostile acts should be understood to be acts which by their nature
and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces.” 119
The Commentaries express the view that on a temporal basis, “the word ‘hostilities’ covers not only the
time that the civilian actually makes use of a weapon, but also, for example, the time that he is carrying it,
as well as situations in which he undertakes hostile acts without using a weapon”. 120
Essentially the same approach applies to civilians in non-international armed conflicts. The
Commentaries on AP II “implies that there is a sufficient causal relationship between the act of
participation and its immediate consequences”,121 in order for a civilian to have taken a direct part in
hostilities.

3. ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY & DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
The private military and security company literature has not engaged in an analysis of whether
humanitarian actors using armed private security for defensive purposes constitutes “direct participation
in hostilities”.122 There are, however, two positions that have been staked out on the matter. Fred Schreier
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and Marina Caparini state that armed escorts by a private security company “would in practice constitute
a military operation”, according to the ICRC’s view. 123 Conversely, Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, a legal
advisor to the ICRC, has written that “all employees of PMCs/PSCs [private military and security
companies] present in situations of armed conflict and hired by entities other than states” will be entitled
to civilian status, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.124
The need for physical armed protection of various forms of humanitarian activity has received some
recognition in international humanitarian treaty law. For example, civilian medical units retain their
protected status as civilians under Article 13(2) of AP I when they “are equipped with light individual
weapons for their own defence or for that of the wounded and sick in their charge” and are “guarded by a
picket or by sentries or by an escort”.125 Medical aircraft personnel are permitted under Article 28(3) of
AP I to carry “light individual weapons as may be necessary to enable the medical personnel on board to
defend themselves and the wounded, sick and shipwrecked in their charge”. 126 Additionally, civil defence
forces, which may be responsible for a wide range of humanitarian tasks during occupation, are not
considered to have undertaken an act harmful to the enemy when their personnel “bear light individual
weapons for the purpose of maintaining order or for self-defence”. 127 However, the occupying forces
“may disarm civil defence personnel for reasons of security”. 128 Likewise, the more recent U.N. Safety
Convention recognizes “the right to act in self-defence”129 of U.N. and associated personnel, which may
include humanitarian personnel. These international treaty provisions suggest that a civilian does not take
a direct part in hostilities simply on account of carrying light weapons for individual self-defence against,
at least, banditry and criminality.
Therefore, blanket assertions that humanitarian personnel automatically lose their protected status as
civilians by using armed private security contractors is not consistent with international humanitarian law.
The contextual nature of the inquiry into the suspension or loss of civilian status through “direct
participation in hostilities”, and recognition in treaty law of certain rights of armed individual self-defence
by civilians, discussed above, requires a case-by-case assessment into whether the use of private security
contractors in a given situation entails the loss or suspension of protected status by humanitarian
personnel and premises that are the subject of defensive armed protection.
As a result of this conclusion, the key to whether humanitarian personnel or objects lose their protected
status, or their safety put at risk by their own private security contractors (in close proximity) having their
protected status lost, is the nature of the conduct of the armed private security contractor.
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A civilian that uses armed force in self-defence that is a necessary and proportionate response to a threat
by an individual or group that is not a Party to the armed conflict would not entail a loss of protected
status because it is not directed at the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces. Therefore, if
armed private security contractors hired by a humanitarian organization fire their weapons in legitimate
self-defence to protect their client against banditry and criminality by individuals or groups that are not
Parties to the armed conflict, legally there will be no loss of protected status. Taking this further, Michael
Schmitt argues that a private security company defending civilians or civilian objects against an attack by
unlawful combatants engaged in criminal activities or war crimes would similarly not constitute direct
participation in hostilities. 130
If a civilian fires a weapon at a combatant without provocation, then certainly he would be taking a direct
part in hostilities, such that his protected status is lost for the duration of the participation. The more
controversial issue is whether a civilian loses their protected status if they fire a weapon at a combatant in
order to defend themselves against the unlawful acts of the combatant. In other words, does the retention
of protected status as a civilian preclude the use of armed force in self-defence against combatant who is
illegally targeting the civilian?
On one hand, Lindsey Cameron argues that if a private security guard returns fire to defend against a
Party to the conflict, the guard will be directly participating in hostilities, entailing a loss of protected
status.131 For this argument, Cameron relies on Article 49(1) of AP I, which states that “‘[a]ttacks’ means
acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”. With respect, this analysis is
misplaced. The definition of attacks in Article 49(1) does not relate to the concept of what types of acts
will constitute “direct participation in hostilities” by a civilian. Rather, the definition of “attacks” is
related to the prohibition against an attack on civilians, as in Article 51(2) and (4). In other words, Article
49(1) ensures that civilians are protected from acts of violence taken by the adversary, either in defence or
offence. Therefore, Article 49(1) does not offer any assistance for the present analysis.
On the other hand, Michael Schmitt argues that civilians have a right of self-defence against unlawful
actions by combatants, such that they retain protected status:
Civilians may also always defend themselves (because they are not legitimate targets under
humanitarian law). In such cases, the civilian is acting either to enforce the law or in accordance
with their right to defend persons and property in domestic and international criminal law. It
would be absurd to hold that the law disallows defense against illegal actions by the victims
thereof or by those who might come to their aid. . . . Of course, any lawful use of force must be
necessary and proportionate.132

At least one of the experts in the ICRC consultative meetings on “direct participation in hostilities” agrees
that “if a private security contractor’s role is defensive and involves defending persons who are not
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legitimate targets themselves, then they should not be regarded as engaged in DPH [direct participation in
hostilities] even if they have to use considerable force to do so”.133
Under international criminal law, “an imminent and unlawful use of force” – such as the intentional
targeting of humanitarian personnel – may be repelled with force that is reasonable and proportionate to
protect oneself or another, or property essential for the survival of that person or another.134 As with the
“direct participation in hostilities” test, however, any argument related to self-defence under international
criminal law “must be assessed on its own facts and in the specific circumstances relating to each
charge”. 135
A private security contractor using armed force against a combatant to defend humanitarian personnel
against an unlawful attack would not be criminally responsible under international law. This does not,
however, directly answer the question of whether in the process, they would lose their protected status as
a civilian.
It would be incongruous for international criminal law to authorize a civilian to respond with reasonable,
necessary, and proportionate force to an imminent unlawful attack by a combatant, only to have
international humanitarian law deem that that very act of defence authorizes the illegal attacker to then
legitimately attack the civilian, since they are directly participating in hostilities at that time. If the initial
attack on the civilian was illegal under international humanitarian law, then it would be inconsistent with
general principles of law for the attacker to rely on their own breach of law to justify their continued
attack. Consequently, neither the private security contractor nor the humanitarian personnel they are
protecting would be taking a direct part in hostilities, entailing a loss of protected status, if they use
reasonable, necessary, and proportionate force to defend themselves against illegal intentional targeting
by any individual or group, including Parties to the conflict.
Regardless of whether humanitarian personnel retain their protected status as civilians de jure under
international humanitarian law, it has been argued that such status will be of little effect as a matter of
practice. For example, “[b]oth ICRC and MSF refuse to use security contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq,
on the basis that to do so would in fact decrease staff security by risking associating them with parties to
an armed conflict”.136
Likewise, while the U.S. military “asserts that it does not violate international law for a civilian employee
or a contractor with an armed force to carry a weapon for personal defense . . . Joint Publication 4-0
acknowledges that the wear of arms by contractors in an ‘uncertain or hostile environment can cloud their
status, leaving them open to being targeted as a combatant’.”137 An even more serious problem is where
private security firms are retained to provide services to both civilian and military clients in the same area
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of operations. In such circumstances, problems with the principle of distinction between combatants and
civilians are likely to arise.138

B. HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
A second issue related to the rights and obligations of humanitarian organizations that hire private
security contractors is whether access to provide relief is affected by the decision to hire a private security
company for armed protection of relief consignments.
Under international humanitarian law, the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be neutral and
impartial in both international and non-international armed conflicts.139 In Nicaragua v. United States of
America, the International Court of Justice emphasized that humanitarian aid is not unlawful intervention,
so long as it is neutral and non-discriminatory:
There can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another
country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful
intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law. The characteristics of such aid
were indicated in the first and second of the fundamental principles declared by the Twentieth
International Conference of the Red Cross, that ‘The Red Cross, born of a desire to bring assistance
without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours – in its international and
national capacity – to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose
is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual
understanding, friendship, co-operation and lasting peace amongst all peoples’ and that ‘It makes
no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours
only to relieve suffering, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress.140

As discussed in Part II(B), resort to local armed guards or state armed forces to protect humanitarian
personnel, property, or materiel is arguably more likely to offend the principle of neutrality than hiring a
foreign private security company for such services.
However, there are countervailing concerns related to state sovereignty in Additional Protocol I that
would require a humanitarian organization hiring a private security company to provide defensive armed
protection to obtain the approval of the state. Article 71(4) of AP I states: “[u]nder no circumstances may
relief personnel exceed the terms of their mission under this Protocol. In particular they shall take account
of the security requirements of the Party in whose territory they are carrying out their duties. The mission
of any of the personnel who do not respect these conditions may be terminated”. 141 The Commentaries to
Article 71 of AP I state that personnel participating in relief actions “do not have a ‘right’ to carry out a
particular task, and the reason for granting them a status in international humanitarian law is to allow
them to ‘act’ effectively for the benefit of a civilian population lacking essential supplies”.142
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IV. CONCLUSION
Non-international armed conflict, ethnically-motivated violence, failed and failing states, and insurgency
warfare have come to dominate modern armed conflict. The need for humanitarian assistance, however,
has remained and, in some cases, increased dramatically. It is in this environment that a mélange of state
and non-state actors operate across the spectrum of players involved both as belligerents propagating
violence, and humanitarians attempting to mitigate suffering.
The traditional humanitarian security paradigm, premised on a state-centric world order with a limited
number of players, has been stretched to the breaking point in many instances. Lack of respect for
international humanitarian law by certain non-state armed groups, intentional targeting of humanitarian
personnel, and the numerous other factors explored in this paper, have rendered the consent-based
approach to ensuring protection of humanitarian personnel, property, and materiel obsolete in many cases.
The inadequacy of the consent-based model of humanitarian protection, coupled with the increased risk to
humanitarian personnel in the field, has resulted in a proliferation of both the actors involved in delivering
humanitarian aid and the security options humanitarian organizations have resorted to. The armed
protection debate in the humanitarian community is only likely to grow more intense given these realities.
Where a humanitarian organization makes the decision to remain in a theatre of operations where armed
protection is a necessity, it is faced with the options of hiring local guards, obtaining protection from state
armed forces, or hiring a private security company. This paper has argued that hiring professional foreign
security contractors is more likely to support the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian organizations
than the hiring of local guards, which is fraught with challenges, including concerns of protection rackets
and affiliations with local armed groups. Furthermore, relying on physical security from state armed
forces is often more likely to associate a humanitarian organization with a Party to the conflict than
relying on foreign private security contractors. As a consequence, where defensive armed security is
sought by a humanitarian organization, private security companies are likely to be seriously considered.
Before a humanitarian organization hires a private security company to protect its personnel, property, or
materiel, a number of factors should be considered to ensure its rights and obligations under international
humanitarian law are respected. This paper has focused on two threshold issues, namely, the impact on
the protected status of humanitarians, and their ability to access populations in need. Debate on these
implications and further research to identify other potential international humanitarian law implications
should be welcomed to bring some clarity to this murky and complex area of law.
With respect to maintaining protected status under international humanitarian law, involving immunity
from attack and other legal protections, international treaty provisions examined in this paper suggest that
a civilian does not take a direct part in hostilities simply on account of carrying light weapons for
individual self-defence against banditry and criminality. A private security contractor using necessary,
reasonable, and proportionate force to defend humanitarian personnel, property, and materiel against
banditry, criminality, or unlawful combatants would not be taking a direct part in hostilities. As a result,
protected status should not be in jeopardy in such a situation. It is notable that studies discussed in this
paper found the most common security risk faced by humanitarian organizations to be from individuals or
groups that are not Parties to the conflict. However, the security threats will vary from conflict to conflict.
If a private security contractor hired by a humanitarian organization were to use unprovoked armed force
against a party to the conflict, they would be taking a direct part in hostilities and their protected status
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would be lost until such time as their participation ceased. At a minimum, the relevant Party to the
conflict could argue that they were legally responding to an attack by the contractors and that the harm
visited on humanitarian personnel or premises was consistent with rules governing collateral damage.
More aggressively and controversially, the Party to the conflict could argue that the acts of direct
participation in hostilities by the private security contractors constitute acts of the humanitarian personnel
based on their relationship, such that the protected status of both the contractors and humanitarian objects
are suspended, justifying the direct targeting of the humanitarian personnel as such.
The most problematic scenario arises where a Party to the conflict intentionally targets humanitarian
personnel, property, or materiel illegally, and private security contractors respond in defence with
proportionate, necessary, and reasonable force. This paper has concluded that neither the private security
contractor nor the humanitarian personnel they are protecting should be considered to have taken a direct
part in hostilities in such a situation.
As a result of these conclusions regarding protected status, a case-by-case assessment of the nature of the
conduct of private security contractors hired by a humanitarian organization will determine whether
protected status is maintained as a matter of law. Given this realization, we are concerned with how
private security contractors actually behave in practice, as opposed to what the terms of their contract and
rules of engagement specify. In other words, if the agreed terms between a private security company and
humanitarian organization specify rules of engagement that would, on paper, prevent contractors from
engaging in conduct that could be interpreted as direct participation in hostilities, humanitarian personnel
or premises could nevertheless be harmed in a legal attack if their contractors exceeded their rules of
engagement and directly participated in hostilities. In the pitch of such a firefight, it would be of no avail
for a humanitarian organization to simply rely on the language of the contract in an attempt to distance
their humanitarian personnel from the contractors they hired.
Consequently, ensuring proper conduct by private security contractors requires a range of preventative
and reactive measures before a humanitarian organization can reasonably manage the risk of retaining
such a firm. 143 A preliminary list of such measures, similar to those that would be required for other
clients, could include the following:
1) Preventative approaches:
a) Obtaining information on the human rights record and past performance of the company;
b) Well-defined scope of activities covered under the contract;
c) Clear and appropriate rules of engagement, including rules on carrying and use of firearms, as
well as disclosure of whether armed force will be on hand or on call;
d) Requirements for contractors to be subject to and compliant with local laws;
e) Clauses to remove contractors from duty and terminate contract (with penalties to the contractor)
for improper conduct;
143

See discussion in Cockayne, supra note 3 at 10-12; see also Report on the Use of Armed Protection for
Humanitarian Assistance, supra note 72; K. Van Brabant, Operational Security Management in Violent
Environments: A Field Manual for Aid Agencies (Overseas Development Institute: London, 2000); see generally,
Michael Cottier, “Elements for Contracting and Regulating Private Security and Military Companies” (2006) 863
International Review of the Red Cross 637.

30

Humanitarian Assistance & The Private Security Debate:
An International Humanitarian Law Perspective

On the Edges of Conflict

f) Vetting of individual contractors;
g) Training requirements for contractors in international humanitarian law and human rights; and
h) Monitoring and reporting of activities to determine whether the contractual terms and rules of
engagement are followed in practice.

2) Reactive approaches:
a) Investigation of alleged misconduct;
b) Considerations of suspension or removal of contractor from duty;
c) Consideration of contract termination;
d) Reporting violation: state of operation, state of incorporation of firm, state of nationality of
perpetrator; and
e) Ensuring full cooperation with investigation.

A challenge facing many humanitarian organizations is a shortfall in capacity to conduct these due
diligence steps, which is a cause for concern. While enhanced collaboration and information sharing
between humanitarian organizations about the private security companies they hire is a positive step,
there are mixed reviews on the extent to which this is happening in practice. 144 A concrete proposal by
Major General Tim Cross is the creation of an “updated register/database of financially transparent firms
with a good track record”. 145
On an individual organization basis, James Cockayne’s study found that most non-governmental
organizations do not take sufficient measures within their power to enhance accountability of the private
security contractors they hire and, as a result, there is a “significant lack of control, increasing risk for
users”.146 For example, his study found only one general reference in contracts between humanitarian
organizations and private security companies to the international standards on use of force and
firearms.147
The role of donors in enhancing the policies and procedures of humanitarian organizations hiring private
security companies is likely to focus attention on ensuring due diligence is undertaken. 148 At the same
time, it must be noted that the bargaining power of humanitarian organizations to secure contractual
concessions is limited due to the relatively small segment of the market that they represent.
Finally, to ensure humanitarian access, humanitarian organizations should obtain authorization from the
state in which relief is to be delivered before using private security companies for defensive armed
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protection. It also bears mentioning that without recognized status under a status of forces agreement
(SOFA), a separate agreement with the host government, or an explicit exemption, humanitarian
personnel and private security contractors will be fully subject to local laws, which may affect the legality
of their use of private security contractors.149
Delivering humanitarian assistance in the midst of the diverse and complex forms of modern armed
conflict is a significant challenge that strikes at the core assumptions of the early humanitarian movement.
Understanding how the changing nature of armed conflict has affected the risks of humanitarian action
and expanded alternative approaches to security is an important starting point. Factors affecting the
decision to hire private security contractors are likely to vary between organizations, based largely on
their philosophical underpinnings.
The use of private security contractors by humanitarian organizations is a topic deserving of greater
attention due, in part, to its impact on the broader humanitarian community and the potential impact that
this practice has on the decision of state armed forces to directly deliver humanitarian assistance.
Humanitarian organizations that choose to hire private security contractors would benefit from an
exchange of information with one another and sharing of best practices. Bringing together representatives
of humanitarian organizations, state armed forces, private security companies, policy makers, and
academics with diverse viewpoints on these matters could also assist in confronting these issues.
At the end of the day, as Sean Greenaway and Andrew Harris have emphasized, throughout this debate
what must be forefront in our minds is the common goal of the effective and safe delivery of humanitarian
assistance to those in need. 150
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